In Afghanistan, administrative corruption, state capture, systemic and political corruption, patronage, cronyism, bidding for Chief of Police (CoP) appointments and drug-related corruption has hindered effective law enforcement. This is due to the fact that institutions and anti-corruption units have been infiltrated by the government to serve criminal interests. The rule of law is perverted by the Afghan police to serve all manner of criminal activities, such as: drug trafficking (and preserving the interests of criminal groups involved in trafficking), land theft, real estate swindling, tax and customs evasion, the operation of illegal security forces and illegal monopolies on markets with legal goods, and so forth. The
Introduction
In Afghanistan, administrative corruption, state capture, systemic and political corruption, patronage, cronyism, bidding for Chief of Police (CoP) appointments and drug-related corruption has hindered effective law enforcement. This is due to the fact that institutions and anti-corruption units have been infiltrated by the government to serve criminal interests.
Those criminal interests are often linked to the drug trade. As a number of experts have observed, many elements of Afghan government structures serve individual patrons and not the wider public interest. 1 For instance, appointments of senior officials, such as police chiefs and provincial governors, are based on bidding wars: positions regularly sell for hundreds of thousands of United States (US) dollars and these positions cost even more in high drug producing areas. 2 This has distorted both the provision of security and the rule of law.
The rule of law is perverted by the Afghan police to serve all manner of criminal activities, such as: drug trafficking (and preserving the interests of criminal groups involved in trafficking), land theft, real estate swindling, tax and customs evasion, the operation of illegal security forces and illegal monopolies on markets with legal goods, and so forth. The
Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan government are perceived as highly corrupt in the eyes of ordinary Afghans. This has led to public discontent toward an illegitimate government and police force that has arguably remobilised support for the Taliban. As a consequence, the security situation has further deteriorated. Therefore, a robust anticorruption strategy for the Afghan police force is required due to the fact that-as is held to be central to the proper functioning of a liberal state-the police and judges are pivotal law enforcement actors.
This article examines the features of corruption and clientelism in the Afghan police and assesses the effectiveness of the anti-corruption strategies implemented to date. In the first section, the research methodology is outlined and this is followed by an overview of the different forms corruption takes and the perceptions of corruption among ordinary Afghans.
This allows for a consideration of four prominent causes of corruption in the Afghan police.
Subsequently, the following two sections discuss internal Ministry of Interior (MoI) anticorruption strategies, pay reform, recruitment and stationing in the ANP. This provides the basis for an analysis of the findings from the original research conducted by the author,
Forms of corruption
Police corruption concerns the misconduct of police officers and patrolmen. Prominent examples of this are: accepting bribes and extorting illegal tolls; manipulating laws, duties and rules; breaching human rights; and interfering with investigations, arrests and the justice system to obtain financial or personal gain. Bribery and extortion are two main forms of police corruption that provide officers with opportunities to make additional money to supplement poor wages. Police officers may demand extortive payments from citizens, such as false traffic fines in Pakistan, or else threaten to arrest citizens if a falsified fee is not paid. 6 Similarly in Afghanistan, the ANP has developed a reputation of engaging in bribery and toll extortion. In many cases at the provincial level, the traffic police request payments to allow vehicles to pass. If these are not paid, drivers face being charged for bogus violationsthe proceeds from which are then paid up the chain of command to the CoP. In Kandahar, senior police have been charging 20,000 Afghanistan Afghani (AFN) (an estimated US$400 at the time) for every passing vehicle, and failure to pay leads to seizure of the vehicle. 7 Moreover, police commanders collect wages of 'ghost' policemen by overstating the numbers working under them. 8 Often, the Ministry of Finance representative who 'was supposed to supervise the CoP' would have involvement in such corruption. 9 There are certain factors motivating police corruption such as the possible illicit rewards to be won by engaging in poppy trafficking. This usually occurs at the provincial level with local power brokers and the local government. 10 The police also manipulate poppy eradication schemes by extorting bribes from farmers. The Afghan security forces are corrupt in many more ways than simply taxing cultivators of the poppy crop or smuggling opium.
Other corrupt practices include roadside extortion, equipment and uniform abuse and paying off bosses to retain posts in profitable areas for extortive practices. 11 In addition, there is a sense that prosecution and justice are commodities for sale. 12 For instance, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Rule of Law Advisor argued that drug smugglers are able to bribe or intimidate police and judges to drop their charges. 13 All the ANP, particularly the ABP and the CNPA, are overwhelmed with drug-related corruption. 14 Criminals or drug-lords may often bribe senior police officers or border police in exchange for cash incentives in the Afghan narcotics industry and local power brokers are engaged in the drug-related protection industry.
The police are also prey to corrupt senior actors that can breed corruption in the lower ranks, who have low literacy rates of 14-15 per cent. 15 The Head of Transitional Justice for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) similarly argued that 'corruption is widespread all over institutions' and 'this is more evident in the security forces'. 16 However, it should be acknowledged that there are differences between the police and army.
Despite the huge resources invested by international donors, patronage has flourished.
Individuals and groups compete for favours from patrons who distribute state resources and jobs and this can disrupt police reform and clear policy-making. 17 Therefore, it is also important to note that a principal driver of corruption among the Afghan police is ethnic favouritism. This has an important influence on both internal structures and promotions within the police as well as police relations with local communities and hence their perceived legitimacy. There are clear ethnic patterns when studying CoP appointments from different Ministers of Interior: for instance, Tajiks and Uzbeks were heavily over-represented in 2002 due to the Northern Alliance reaping the benefits from the defeated Taliban and Tajiks are still over-represented.
Perceptions of corruption
There are many explanations why Afghan policemen engage in corrupt practices. 
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In the ANP, salaries are low at US$70 monthly, which is insufficient to cater for an Afghan family and often leads to stealing and survival-based corruption.
Afghans stress that corruption is prevalent throughout the ANP which is revealed in corruption perception reports. In an Afghan nationwide survey conducted for the UNDP, 27
per cent of respondents in Kabul claimed that many police personnel routinely abuse their authority and 21 per cent thought the same nationwide. 20 Almost two thirds of Afghans (65 per cent) believed that many police officers use office equipment for personal use and 52 per cent stressed that the ANP abuse their authority. It was also emphasised by 42 per cent of the respondents that bribes and gifts are commonly given when communicating with the ANP.
Almost half (48 per cent) stated that shopkeepers are regularly forced to pay a protection fee to policemen. 21 However, it is crucial to stress that public perceptions of police corruption are complex and there are many entities within the Afghan police. Therefore such opinions are based on the ANP overall but principally concern everyday street police as most Afghans interact with them on a daily basis.
Another nationwide Afghan civil society corruption perception report conducted by
Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) surveyed the perceptions of 1,258 Afghan respondents on corruption. Of these respondents, 70 per cent believed that corruption is the most prevalent problem across Afghanistan insofar as it undermines the services provided by the security, justice and public sectors. 22 The report also argues that the Afghan police is the most publically hated and most corrupt institution in the country that regularly extorts bribes from everyday civilians. 23 Corruption can be seen to have threatened state-building and statesociety relations, empowered the insurgency, increased social inequality, hampered the rule of law and access to basic public services and led to human rights violations on a daily basis. 24 All of these factors constrain economic development and affect the poor disproportionately: poorer households are forced to pay a higher slice of their income as bribes for basic services on a daily basis. 25 Such perceptions of high levels of corruption in the Afghan government and police have led to increased support for the Taliban. In the IWA survey, 60 per cent of respondents claimed that the Karzai administration has been the most corrupt over the last 20 years with the MoI and the courts being the most corrupt institutions. 26 According to the Head of Access to Justice for The Asia Foundation, the Karzai-led government is arguably one of the most corrupt regimes in Afghanistan's history and has been even worse than the Taliban when they were in power-a striking observation given that the latter were far more violent and restrictive of civil liberties and human rights than the current Government of Afghanistan. 27 In the IWA survey, 50 per cent of respondents stressed that corruption contributes to the growth of the Taliban and a third of the respondents claimed that the Taliban are fighting against corruption in the Afghan government. 28 Engelhardt argues that the police are fuelled by corruption and prefer to desert rather than fight unlike the Taliban. 
Exploring the causes of corruption in the Afghan police
The previous section looked at the broad manifestations of corruption in the Afghan police. It is now necessary to explore the prominent causes of the phenomenon. This section seeks to draw out four prominent causes of corruption as identified through the original research conducted as part of this study.
Structural causes of corruption, patronage and nepotism
Patrons that own state resources often favour family, friends, tribes and political supporters for appointments, financial gain or lucrative opportunities. 36 Moreover, systemic corruption is prevalent within the MoI and individuals purchase or rent a post by paying a lump sum and/or sending a monthly stipend of bribes extorted up the chain of command to their superior or recruiter to maintain their post. This is common in lucrative drug areas. It is also linked to non-meritocratic recruitment and prevalent patron-client relations. 40 In Afghanistan, daily bribery and providing a small gift is a frequent mode of contract to speed-up a transaction or basic service between the bribe payer and bribe takerusually a civil servant, policeman or judge. 41 For instance, a Legal Consultant of the Justice Sector Support Programme (JSSP) claimed that he had to pay money to get his drivers' licence issued so that he could take up his new post to earn money to cater for his family. 42 Similarly, the Project Co-ordinator of the Centre for Policy and Human Development (CPHD) argued that 'it is an unbelievable task to be able to get your passport without paying someone a bribe' because of the prevalence of so-called 'administrative corruption'. 43 Corruption does have cultural connotations and is thus a social construction. However, the main argument is that corruption, whether perceived as systemic or cultural, is engrained in both Afghan state structures and society as part of everyday interactions.
Economic necessity
Corruption is caused by the lack of economic provision. Wages are inadequate to cover costs of living, which leads to the police demanding bribes and extortion as a survival strategy.
This is particularly evident with low-ranked policemen. When taking this explanation into account, corruption and economic need are interrelated. A Legal Consultant of JSSP argued that houses for rent in Afghanistan are 'not less than US$400' and the wages of policemen and prosecutors are under half of this amount. As a consequence, 'when a policeman or prosecutor does not have enough money to pay the rent of his house; he will take bribes'. 44 Increasing the wages of the police may reduce corruption if one surmises that corrupt behaviour is induced by low salaries: bribe money would be reduced if incomes rise.
Afghan legal experts argue that pay needs to be effectively reformed in the Afghan police and judicial system in order to reduce corruption and bribery. 45 In addition, anticorruption and civil society senior personnel claimed that paying higher salaries to the security forces can guarantee economic security for their families, enhance loyalty to the state and counter both corruption and the insurgency. 46 Hence, the provision of adequate wages, a secure living environment and decreasing incentives for engaging in corruption are crucial to counter corruption in the police.
State capture
Parts of the state that include the government, security and justice sectors are influenced by non-state criminal networks and narrow private groups to preserve and protect their illicit interests. This entices political elites and public officials to trade in illegal and lucrative black-market commodities such as drugs and arms. This negatively affects the role of the police and their functions are perverted by political and criminal intrusion. Therefore, the police are influenced to protect elite and criminal groups' black market commodities.
Simultaneously, powerful drug-lords, senior officials and mineral smugglers who are also engaged in such illicit activity retain immunity from prosecution. In particular, the ANP are manipulated by powerful figures to release drug traffickers, killers and thieves.
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The drug trade has resulted in weak law enforcement due to the political intrusion of the security and judicial sectors. USIP's Senior Rule of Law Advisor argued that 'the culture of impunity exists today' where drug smugglers with powerful political connections 'are not held accountable' and the courts function in their interests due to bribery or threats. 48 The
Deputy Chair of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission similarly argued that if notorious drug traffickers are caught then 'the same day they are released either by the police, Attorney General, primary court, Supreme Court or the prison will be issued a decree to release these notorious people'. 49 Hence, the accused that are released are often notorious drug traffickers.
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Once sectors of the state have been infiltrated to serve private criminal interests, systemic corruption linked with the drug trade is hard to fight within Afghan institutions.
Afghanistan has weak government institutions and investigation units that lack independence from political intrusion. The Director for Global Rights claimed that the Afghan government clearly does not 'want a truly independent judiciary or anti-corruption agencies'. 51 Due to forms of political intrusion that serve criminal interests, the chiefs of anti-corruption agencies apply flexibility and 'leave cases on the shelf' to avoid certain figures with political connections being held accountable. individual from Kandahar's Ghilzai majority tribe. 54 Therefore, nepotism-namely favouritism-is a consequence of a traditional tribal system that has been imposed on a central government. 55 This remains prevalent.
Furthermore, the ANP lacks loyalty to the state. A large portion of the force remains loyal only to regional commanders and local warlords rather than the state MoI. 56 A Research
Officer for the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) argued that if the ANP 'were formerly loyal to an ex-commander in the north, they are probably still more loyal to that commander than they are to the central government'. 57 Such loyalty is often based on ethnic grounds.
It is important to note that all of these four types of corruption that frequently occur in Afghanistan are not different levels but rather different forms that are interconnected and overlapping. It must be acknowledged that grand corruption within President Hamid Karzai's family, including drug trafficking and illicit businesses, and petty corruption such as patrolmen extorting bribes to supplement low income are different forms of corruption.
However, corruption constantly fluctuates between these four explanations and may range from low levels to high levels of corruption. Hence, the relationship between petty and systemic corruption is a constant trend and the two interact with one another.
Responses to corruption
The previous sections covered the forms, perceptions and causes of corruption which allows for a discussion of anti-corruption strategies. This section covers international and Afghan governmental strategies for tackling corruption within the Afghan police force. It initially covers the efforts of Germany and the US over police reform which is followed by MoI efforts to curb corruption, with international assistance, and the challenges faced. The final part covers specific measures to combat corruption in the Afghan police. This includes the central issues of pay reform, meritocratic recruitment and stationing.
International anti-corruption efforts
In order to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, this section begins with an examination of the various initiatives and measures the Afghan government and internationals have introduced. Initially, the Afghan Interim Authority asked Germany to lead police reform due to its previous involvement in providing assistance to the police. However, Germany failed to successfully advance police reforms. The police remained untrained and had poor equipment, while 70-90 per cent were illiterate and remained loyal to warlords and local commanders rather than the central government. 58 Since 2005, the US army has spent a staggering US$14 billion to train, reform and equip the ANP. The ANP had 157,000 troops in May 2014 and the aim is to reach up to 162,000 by the end of 2014. 60 The US has spent an estimated US$102 over the past decade in an attempt to develop Afghanistan in addition to $6 trillion from the outset of the invasion. In addition, the international community has donated US$3.17 billion to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan police salaries but wages remain low. 61 It is also important to point out that the counter-insurgency strategy to combat the Taliban has generally taken precedence over protecting the public. The aggressive behaviour of the ALP debatably attracts further insurgent attacks in rural Afghanistan, as has been prominently argued by President Karzai. 62 Police corruption has increased support for the Taliban and therefore anti-corruption efforts in the ANP can also be viewed as important in terms of counter-insurgency strategy.
Afghan Ministry of Interior anti-corruption strategy
In order to combat corruption, the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL)
Anti-Corruption Implementation Plan based in Kabul focuses on capacity-building, prevention (including training) and enforcement. This three-fold strategy is part of the MoI's National Police Strategy. First, building the capacity of the MoI focuses on the institutional systems of merit-based appointments, accountability, procurement, weapons transparency and personal asset exposure. In addition, an adequate police salary is on the agenda to deter corruption and attract high quality candidates that will remain in their posts. Second, prevention is to be enhanced via public awareness campaigns, specialised training and the application of procedures to identify corrupt activities and counter corruption, drugs and illegal armed opposition groups. However, Faqiryar was forced to retire and Salehi was released, at the request of President Karzai, for allegedly having his human rights breached. 64 This case provides ample evidence that the head of state can manipulate anti-corruption staff and assert his political clout during major cases of corruption in order to protect his close political aides.
Despite the investigatory and referral powers that the MoI possesses to curb police corruption, four interviewees argued that the police are heavily involved in extorting bribes and that cases against corrupt officers are often dropped within the MoI. Moreover, drugmules are released from either the police or investigative units due to political interference. 65 Furthermore, anti-corruption and investigative agencies have little faith in the police to conduct unbiased professional investigations of corruption. Pay reform, meritocratic recruitment and stationing in the Afghan police have been endorsed to combat the four aforementioned explanations of the causes of police corruption.
Pay reform, recruitment and stationing
The previous section covered international and governmental attempts at police reform and their efforts to curb corruption in the Afghan police. This now allows a section to examine methods of combatting petty corruption and patronage. This section therefore covers the general responses on pay reform, recruitment and stationing more specifically. Initially, a background on police training is provided to address some of the issues with corruption prior to an examination on anti-corruption efforts.
In November 2007, the US implemented the Focused District Development (FDD)
programme to improve police reform, combat corruption, provide new equipment and enhance the capability of and rule of law within the ANP across 365 districts. 66 Whilst the district police were being trained, all untrained recruits were brought to a Regional Training
Centre for the AUP for eight weeks under the supervision of Police Mentoring Teams. appointed. 70 This included four persons linked with illegal armed groups that were also barred from parliamentary elections. In addition, others included renowned human rights violators, narcotics traffickers and warlords, and several were involved in government corruption, bribery and interference in police investigations. 71 These provincial police chiefs and generals should have been investigated for human rights violations and corruption rather than being arbitrarily appointed.
Candidates with low levels of literacy regularly fake qualifications and change their ethnic backgrounds for the recruitment of an ethnically balanced and diverse police force that is proportional to the population. As a consequence, large numbers of corrupt and incompetent individuals linked with leading power groups in the MoI and cabinet enter the ANP which hinders meritocracy. 72 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) sectored surveys also suggest that 54 per cent of the ANP received assistance in recruitment and eight per cent paid bribes. 73 In Jalalabad, the 'admission, selection, appointment and promotion' processes are not based on merit but rather corruption and, across Afghanistan, police are 'selected, appointed and promoted'. 74 This is due to their affiliation with warlords and high-level corrupt government officials, with bribes expected in such processes. Afghan police officers purchase the post where they want to be assigned. This is usually in areas where there are opportunities to engage in petty corruption such as extorting bribes from cart vendors selling produce in main cities. 75 Moreover, the police officers pay to work in high poppy cultivating areas in order to work within the border patrol force to extort bribes from merchants and truckers involved in smuggling. 76 Anti-corruption strategies have focused on limiting ethnic and tribal discrimination within the ANSF. Alikuzai claims that this is to ensure that certain ethnic groups or individuals from 'particular regions' who lack access to influential power brokers in highlevel commands 'are not selectively posted' to extremely hostile 'areas for too long without being rotated out' and that commands are not dominated by Tajiks or another particular ethnic group. 77 The MoI suggests that its own ministry is extremely politicised and wellconnected illiterate provincial police chiefs with no police experience or qualifications are appointed, namely by President Karzai. The MoI also claim that resources are diverted within the ministry and the loyalty of senior officers to the police is relatively unknown. from corrupt ANA officer corps. 80 The strategy also increases the transparency of assignments and ensures that personnel are assigned randomly to all Afghan regions.
Despite such efforts, elder selections may be based on personal, ethnic and other partisan interests. These selections are part of a qawm system 81 to provide loyalty to the appointer which overrides meritocratic appointments. Elder selection involves a local elder vouching for police candidates to be selected in their province. This mechanism applies mainly to the ALP, not AUP. Policemen with good relations with senior ranked police officers, a CoP, local governor or tribal elder can easily be posted to the province of their choice. Posting can therefore be based on loyalty or paying to work in the desired province with a lump sum or monthly payments to the appointer via a stipend of bribes collected. 82 Hence, corruption, loyalty and patronage still remain with recruitment, meritocracy and stationing of the ANP.
Based on this overview of the central facets of the major anti-corruption strategies, the following section will critically examine pay reform, recruitment, stationing and broader anticorruption strategies with specific reference to the surveys conducted.
Analysis
In the previous sections, the causes of corruption and anti-corruption strategies have been addressed. This section analyses the surveys conducted with 100 low-ranked policemen in Kabul, Logar, Laghman and 12 other provinces. The analysis is divided into two separate parts. The first considers key variables, identified in survey findings, such as living costs, expenses, salary and the number of breadwinners per household that help to account for the pervasive corruption identified in the earlier sections of the article. These are the determinants of corruption. The second part considers stationing strategy. A factor in the initial variables is the number of earners per household which may be affected with random assignment. The survey respondents' perceptions of corruption and anti-corruption strategies will be reflected upon, considering, for instance, whether they felt wages were sufficient to cover living costs and the influence of patronage relations on appointments. Such perceptions provide important insights into the dynamics of survival-based corruption and the reasons behind lottery assignments. It is the perceptions and empirical evidence that will be analysed in relation to both causes of corruption, a deficit of wages and stationing of policemen. The end of the analysis will, however, demonstrate the contradictions of random assignments.
Determinants of corruption
This section analyses the possible determinants of corruption in order to convey certain trends that may impact on corruption such as wages being too low to cover total expenditure and patrolmen being stationed with large families in distant provinces. According to survey respondents, the main determinant of corruption is wage deficiency and other variables add to the economic hardship that low-ranked Afghan policemen face.
The surveys show that the average number of family members per household is 11.5 and solely for patrolmen it is 11. Hence, the majority of the policemen surveyed have large into consideration, the families are large, many family members share rooms and there are no more than two household earners on average. This means that the wages will have to be sufficient for the breadwinners to cover the total expenses for large families. The total living costs, expenses and wages earned will now be addressed. In response to questions that asked how respondents might improve pay and rank reform and anti-corruption strategies, a number of ideas were put forward. Many respondents stated that higher salary increments would help to cover all living costs and provide motivation for good performance and behaviour. For instance, a first lieutenant working in Logar and a patrolman working in Kapisa claimed that low pay is a factor that causes corruption in the Afghan police. In addition, a second lieutenant from Kabul claimed that higher salaries for government employees were needed to reduce corruption in the ANP. A patrolman working in Panjshir stressed that strong oversight and monitoring of the recruitment process and higher salaries are needed to reduce corruption in the Afghan police institution. Furthermore, a patrolman working in Kabul stated that his salary is 'slightly short to fulfil daily life' and that 'increasing police salaries in the lower ranks can finish corruption'.
Family structure was another issue identified by respondents as importantly impacting anti-corruption efforts. Large families rely on more than one breadwinner to cover living costs. For all of those that were the sole breadwinner (18 of the respondents), only two first lieutenants and one patrolman stressed that they were able to cover the total expenses of the household with their salary. One of the first lieutenants working in his home province, Logar, by his own request earns 13,500 AFN per month that covers his 8,000 AFN monthly living costs and expenses for eight family members in owned accommodation (consisting of five rooms). The other first lieutenant working in his home province, Kunduz, by qawm, familial or political ties earns 13,500 AFN per month that covers 10,000 AFN monthly total costs for six family members in owned accommodation (consisting of four rooms). In addition, a patrolman working in his home province, Kapisa, by his own request earns 10,500 AFN that covers 5,000 AFN total monthly living costs and expenses for eight family members in owned housing (consisting of three rooms). In these three cases, even though there is only one breadwinner per household, the salary is high enough to cover low total living costs and expenses. This provides empirical evidence that wages in the lower ranks were sufficient to cover the living costs and expenses of large families. However, these perceptions of sole breadwinners are only based on three of the survey respondents and therefore the other 15 breadwinners struggled with financial costs. AFN per month in living costs and expenses but only earns 11,000 AFN as the sole breadwinner for seven family members. These responses emphasising insufficient wages, principally for lone breadwinners, to cover living costs and expenses suggests that these policemen find it difficult to survive. Hence, there is a high possibility that salary supplementation will be a necessity to cover costs such as engagement in petty corruption.
On the other hand, if there is more than one breadwinner then the policemen claimed that they were able to cover their total living costs and expenses due to support from another family member-namely brother or father. To illustrate, a patrolman working in Logar earns 11,500 AFN per month to contribute to 15,000 AFN monthly for living costs and expenses.
However, the living costs and expenses are affordable due to two salaried household members including his father. Similarly, a first lieutenant that works in Kabul pays 20,000 AFN in monthly expenses (for 13 family members) with a monthly salary of 14,500 AFN.
Despite a 5,500 AFN deficit, he could afford expenses and living costs due to three breadwinners within the household.
Even in instances where there was more than one breadwinner per household working in a home province who earned less than their monthly expenses but could afford expenses due to additional salaries within the household, these respondents recognised that it would be difficult if they were the sole earner. For instance, a patrolman working in his home province, Khost, (who could afford his expenses due to two breadwinners) claimed that salaries should be increased to reduce corruption in the ANP due to the fact that it is tough for one breadwinner to cover all living costs. In addition, a patrolman working in Kabul with the support of five additional earners within the household also acknowledged that covering total living costs and expenses would be difficult in households that only have one salaried person. 86 Similarly, a patrolman from Nangarhar suggested that his 500 AFN monthly deficit of wages for living costs and expenses was affordable due to two breadwinners but it would be tough if he was the only breadwinner.
According to the surveys conducted, it can be argued that pay reform has made little difference at the lower levels of the Afghan police. Patrolmen/non-ranked street police still have low wages and a limited amount of money to pay for the cost of living, unless there is more than one breadwinner per household. The former Afghan Minister of Interior claimed that he needed more time to 'improve the living conditions of the police force, especially assisting them with a housing scheme and also health care' to combat petty corruption.
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Stationing strategy
The analysis so far has provided perceptions and empirical evidence that suggests that low wages, particularly when there is only one earner per household, can lead to corrupt practices. This is to supplement income in order to cater for living costs and expenses for large families.
Therefore, strategies to curb corruption are needed such as pay reform which may reduce petty corruption. Yet, there are also other forms of corruption that were emphasised by the survey respondents when questions were asked about attempts to challenge police corruption.
On the subject of anti-corruption strategies, only five of the survey respondents knew what the MoI anti-corruption strategy entailed. The main strategies to combat corruption in the Afghan police, as indicated by the respondents, consist of providing strong oversight/monitoring of the police to hire and select more honest staff. The respondents expressed that better screening will not only lead to the hiring of more honest staff, but will also avoid police recruitment based on personal relations. This is informative as an indication of MoI strategies that have failed to be understood by the lower levels of the police force but it was acknowledged that patronage relations leading to appointments hinder the meritocratic credibility of the ANP.
It is clear from the analysis that the stationing strategy has been implemented due to concern regarding the influence of patronage relations in relation to appointments. This For those who thought that patronage in recruitment occurs in the ANP (36 per cent), it was perceived that patronage mainly persists in MoI positions. It was also stressed by these respondents that if a policeman knows a commander or a high rank officer, then that policeman will get more salary increments and promotions. These respondents' insights included a friend or academy class fellow having entered high positions due to good relations with senior staff or a commander. For instance, a second lieutenant (who works in his home province, Kabul, by officer selection) stressed that patronage existed as one of his friends was employed by a personal relation. 88 In addition, a patrolman working in Panjshir believed that patronage appointments were prevalent in the ANP and MoI. The patrolman provided an example of a friend who knew a commander that admitted him into a position.
The perceptions of patronage were similar to the above findings when policemen were randomly assigned to another province under the lottery system. To illustrate, a non-ranked policeman who was randomly assigned to Nangarhar, an away province, claimed that patronage was prevalent in the ANP and MoI staff. He provided an example of one of his academy classmates attaining a high rank due to good relations with high authorities. Therefore, there are certain motivations that lead to policemen requesting to be stationed in Kabul. As these findings strongly suggest, a major factor appears to be better opportunities such as extorting more bribes from street vendors and passing vehicles for bogus offences.
Subsequently, a stipend of the bribes collected is paid up the chain of command to the CoP or other senior officers. 89 In addition to opportunities for bribery, other important factors which lead recruits and officers to demand posting to particular areas include the level of insecurity and physical risk. Related to both is the distance and risk involved in travelling to visit one's family.
All of the elder selections led to the appointment of policemen in their home provinces.
In Nangarhar, elders hold powerful influence concerning the appointment of patrolmen according to the six surveys conducted in the province. 90 Five out of six policemen, all patrolmen, were selected to work in their home province by elder selection and the other one was randomly assigned to work in Nangarhar. With qawm, familial or political ties, only two out of 10 (both patrolmen) were posted in an away province. In relation to officer selections, two out of four policemen were posted in home provinces. There were two instances whereby survey respondents admitted that they had paid to be stationed in an away province. To provide one example, a patrolman working in Panjshir claimed that he had paid to move from his home province.
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In relation to the second highest method of posting policemen, the lottery (random) system, all of the respondents were posted in away provinces. This is to reduce patronage networks, qawm advantages and loyalty by serving the interests of an elder, officer or commander. Moreover, this is designed to combat the practice of policemen paying to be stationed in a preferred location. Many of the lottery assigned policemen have a slightly lower ratio of breadwinners per household-two per household. Only six out of the 22 are the only breadwinner per household and all reside in rented accommodation. In all of these cases, the policemen claimed that their salary was insufficient to cater for living costs and family expenses.
For example, a patrolman who applied to his nearest department of police was randomly posted to Kapisa. He claimed that his salary was not enough to cater for living costs and expenses because he is the only breadwinner. 92 Furthermore, in one instance where there are two breadwinners for a household with a large family in an away province due to the lottery system, it is still difficult to cater for living costs and family expenses. To specify, a patrolman working in Logar by lottery assignment claimed that his salary is too low to cover high monthly living costs and family expenses despite having two breadwinners within the household. 93 It can therefore be argued that policemen that are randomly assigned under the lottery system to an away province struggle to pay for living costs and family expenses if they are the sole breadwinner. This is also the case in some instances if there are two breadwinners. Pay reform has the potential to combat petty corruption in the lower ranks but systemic corruption, clientelism and state capture will remain unchallenged with a linear approach.
Hence, increasing the salaries of Afghan policemen would reduce corruption but not significantly. If wages were increased with pay reform as a singular anti-corruption strategy, patronage relations would persist and oversight, disciplinary and internal anti-corruption strategy issues that were prioritised by the ANP survey respondents would remain.
High corruption levels in the ANP and the government has reduced the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of Afghans. It has also been contended that this has led to Taliban 84 This is only an assumption based on the small sample size and is not generalisable.
85 100 surveys were conducted with lower ranked policemen. Therefore, percentages will be used for simplification. However, these percentages are only based on the 100 surveys conducted which do not provide any indication of being representative of an entire province. 86 This patrolman resides in owned accommodation that contains eight rooms for a staggering 22 family members and earns 11,500 AFN per month to pay towards 25,000 AFN monthly living costs and expenses. 87 Interview former Afghan Minister of Interior, York, 23 November 2010. 88 This second lieutenant lives in owned accommodation consisting of eight rooms for 16
family members and earns a monthly salary of 17,000 AFN to pay towards 30,000 AFN monthly family costs. Despite a 13,000 AFN deficit, the second lieutenant stressed that he could cover his total living costs and expenses because there were three breadwinners living in the household, including two of his brothers who also contributed to such costs. 89 Cordesman et al., Afghan National Security Forces, 142; Hafvenstein, 'Afghanistan's Opium Strategy Alternatives', 125. 90 It is important to note that this finding is not representative for the entire Nangarhar province. 91 This patrolman has nine family members living in rented accommodation and earns 9,000 AFN per month for 15,000 AFN monthly total expenses but it is affordable due to the presence of three breadwinners within the household. 92 The patrolman lives in rented accommodation consisting of four rooms with nine family members. He earns 12,500 AFN per month and pays 15,000 AFN for monthly living costs. 93 The patrolman earns 11,500 AFN per month for 11 family members in rented accommodation consisting of five rooms with total monthly expenses and living costs amounting to 15,000 AFN. 94 Both of these scenarios provide qualitative insights into the problems, faced by lower ranked police, of low pay and being posted in an away province due to random assignment. 95 
